Abstract

Does comparative advantage explain legislators’ support for trade liberalization? We use data on potential crop yields as determined by weather and soil characteristics to derive a new plausibly exogenous measure of comparative advantage in agriculture for each district in the United States. Evidence shows that comparative advantage in agriculture predicts how legislators vote on the ratification of preferential trade agreements in Congress. We show that legislators in districts with high agricultural comparative advantage are more likely to mention that trade agreements are good for agriculture in House floor debates preceding roll call votes on their ratifications. Individuals living in the same districts are also more likely to support free trade. Our analysis and results contribute to the literature on the political economy of trade and its distributional consequences and to our understanding of the economic determinants of legislators’ voting decisions.

Abstract

This paper studies the labor market consequences of ethnic politics in African democracies. Using data from 15 countries, 32 elections, and more than 400,000 individuals, we implement a regression discontinuity design that compares individuals from ethnicities connected to parties at the margin of electing a local representative in the national parliament. Having a local ethnic party politician in parliament increases the likelihood of being employed by 2-3 pp. The available evidence supports the hypothesis that this effect results from strategic interactions between politicians and traditional leaders, the latter being empowered to allocate land and agricultural jobs in exchange for votes.