Tanner Regan
Assistant Professor of Economics and International Affairs at George Washington University
bio
Tanner is a former Research Fellow in Economics at the Wheeler Institute for Business and Development, London Business School.
His research focuses on the economics of housing, land tenure, urban planning, and property tax in developing country cities. He uses tools from applied micro and experimental economics, and a combination of satellite imagery, primary surveys and administrative data.
Tanner has a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science and holds an MA and BSc from the University of Toronto. He is affiliated with the Centre for Economic Performance at LSE and the Wheeler Institute for Business and Development at LBS.
Publications
Building the City: From Slums to a Modern Metropolis
Abstract
We model the building of a city, estimate parameters of the model, and calculate welfare losses from institutional frictions encountered in changing land-use. We distinguish formal and slum construction technologies; in contrast to slums, formal structures can be built tall, are durable, and non-malleable. As the city grows areas are initially developed informally, then formally, and then redeveloped periodically. Slums are modelled as a technology choice; however, institutional frictions in land markets may hinder their conversion to formal usage that requires secure property rights. Using unique data on Nairobi for 2003 and 2015, we develop a novel set of facts that support assumptions of the model, estimate all parameters of the model, and calculate welfare losses of conversion frictions. We track the dynamic evolution of the city and compare it with model predictions. In the core city formal sector, about a third of buildings were torn down over 12 years and replaced by buildings on average three times higher. For slums in older areas near the centre, even after buying out slumlords, overcoming institutional frictions would yield gains amounting to about $$18,000 per slum household, thirty times typical annual slum rent payments.
Planning Ahead for Better Neighborhoods: Long-Run Evidence from Tanzania
Abstract
Africa’s demand for urban housing is soaring, even as it faces a proliferation of slums. In this setting, can modest infrastructure investments in greenfield areas where people subsequently build their own houses facilitate long-run neighborhood development? We study Sites and Services projects implemented in seven Tanzanian cities during the 1970s and 1980s, and we use a spatial regression discontinuity design to compare greenfield areas that were treated (de novo) with nearby greenfield areas that were not. We find that by the 2010s, de novo areas developed into neighborhoods with larger, more regularly laid-out buildings and better-quality housing.
No inventor is an island: Social connectedness and the geography of knowledge flows in the US
Abstract
Do informal social ties connecting inventors across distant places promote knowledge flows between them? To measure informal ties, we use a new and direct index of social connectedness of regions based on aggregate Facebook friendships. We use a well-established identification strategy that relies on matching inventor citations with citations from examiners. Moreover, we isolate the specific effect of informal connections, above and beyond formal professional ties (co-inventor networks) and geographic proximity. We identify a significant and robust effect of informal ties on patent citations. Further, we find that the effect of geographic proximity on knowledge flows is entirely explained by informal social ties and professional networks. We also show that the effect of informal social ties on knowledge flows is greater for new entrepreneurs or ‘garage inventors’, for older or ‘forgotten’ patents, and for flows across distant technology fields. It has also become increasingly important over the last two decades.
Ask a Local: Improving the Public Pricing of Land Titles in Urban Tanzania
Abstract
Information on willingness-to-pay is key for public pricing and allocation of services but not easily collected. Studying land titles in Dar-es-Salaam, we ask whether local leaders know and will reveal plot owners’ willingness-to-pay. We randomly assign leaders to predict under different settings then elicit owners’ actual willingness-to-pay. Demand is substantial, but below exorbitant fees. Leaders can predict the aggregate demand curve and distinguish variation across owners. Predictions worsen when used to target subsidies, but adding cash incentives mitigates this. Finally, we demonstrate that leader-elicited information can improve the public pricing of title deeds, raising uptake while maintaining public funds.